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SOME PHASES OF CONDITIONS AND WARRANTIES
IN THE LAW OF SALES OF GOODS
WARRANTIES.
It has been said by high authority that there is in the law no
word more troublesome than the word warranty; for it is constantly
used in different senses, as in the law of insurance, charter-parties
and sales.' In the law of sales of personal property a warranty is an
express or implied statement of something which a party undertakes
shall be a part of the contract, collateral to the express object of it.2
It is a separate, independent, collateral stipulation, which is not
strictly a condition, for it neither suspends, nor defeats the completion
of the sale, the vesting of the thing bargained for in the buyer, or the
right in the seller to the purchase money.3 That a warranty is an
independent agreement appears in those cases in which the seller was
permitted to sue for the purchase price without pleading the war-
ranty;' and that it is a part of the contract of sale, is established by
the rule that warranties in illegal sales are void.5 So, an oral war-
ranty cannot be proved where the contract of sale is in writing and
is silent as to warranties6 but it may be proved in a sale within the
Statute of Frauds, if the statute is satisfied other than by a written
memorandum. 7 That a warranty is an agreement collateral to the
main purpose of the contract of sale to which it is annexed, plainly
appears in the following proposal, which the buyer is supposed to have
accepted: "I will sell you this watch for fifty dollars, and I will war-
rant it to be gold eighteen carats fine." This contract of sale con-
tains two promises on the part of the seller, namely: that he will trans-
fer the general property in the watch, and that he will respond in
damages if it be not gold eighteen carats fine. The latter promise is
I Williston on Sales, Sec. 181.
2 Flint-Walling Mfg. Co. v. Ball, 43 'Mo. App. 504, citing Benj. on Sales,
Sec. 600; Bagley v. Cleveland Rolling Mill Co., 21 Fed. 159.
3 Dorr v. Fisher, I Cush. 271; Sales of Goods Act, Sec. 11 (b).
4 Rogers v. Brown, 103 Me. 478.
5 Finley v. Quirk, 9 'Minn. 194, 86 Am. Dec. 93; Northrup v. Foot, 14
Wend. 248.
6 Lower v. Hickman, 80 Ark. 505, 97 S. W. 681; Sheperd v. Gilroy, 46 Ia.
193; Vierling v. Furnace Co., 170 Il1. 189; Frost v. Blanchard, 97 Mass. 155;
Jolliffe v. Collins, 21 Mo. 338; Seitz v. Brewing Co., 141 U. S. 510. But a
%-ritten warranty after a sale, based on a prior oral warranty is enforceable.
Collette v. Weed, 68 Wis. 428.
7 Northwood v. Rennie, 3 Ont. App. 37 (1878).
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clearly collateral to the former both in form and effect. Precisely
the same things are true in the proposal re-worded thus: "I will sell
you this eighteen carat gold watch for fifty dollars," even though the
collateral form of the warranty has disappeared.
A warranty like other promises is not an enforceable obligation
unless it is supported by a good consideration. If the warranty be
made contemporaneously with the contract of sale, the consideration
of the latter will support the warranty.8 This view is undoubtedly the
law and not subject to criticism; but it is the opinion of the writer
that the true consideration for such a warranty is the sale itself and
not the price of the goods purchased; for it is a fact of common
knowledge in legal and business circles that many a sale would not
have been made if a warranty had been refused. If a warranty be
given after the contract of sale is completed, a new consideration is
necessary as a matter of course; for the sale can no longer be an
inducement to warrant, and the consideration of the sale has been
exhausted by a transfer of the goods.9 A very slight consideration
however, will suffice to support a subsequent warranty.10
In the vast majority of cases sales are effected by the statements
of the seller regarding the quality, character or fitness for use of the
goods transferred. A statement made for the purpose of inducing a
purchase of an article may be an expression of opinion, a representa-
tion, a condition or a warranty. As to conditions a reference to the
first part of this paper must suffice." An expression of opinion is no
part of a contract of sale, and is therefore neither a cause of action
for damages nor a ground for rescission, unless it were given under
circumstances which would justify treating it as a warranty." Where
the parties possess equal knowledge or means of knowledge concern-
8 Mechem on Sales, Sec. 1247; Standard Underground Cable Co. v. Electric
Co., 76 Fed. 422, 22 C. C. A. 258.
9 Benjamin on Sales, Sec. 611.
10 A buyer was justified in refusing to receive goods ordered, and the seller
said that he would warrant the goods against freezing, if the buyer would
accept them, and the warranty was decided to be valid. Cougar v. Chamber-
lain, 14 Wis. 258.
1 See VoL II, of this Review, page 53.
12 In Worth v. McConnell, 42 Mich. 473, the court said: "The represen-
tation made that it was a very good machine and would do very nice work
falls far short of amounting to a warranty. If this statement could be so held,
then no man could with any degree of safety say anything in praise of his
wares without being held as thereby warranting them-a doctrine certainly
not sustained in the law." See also Baldwin v. Daniel. 69 Ga. 782; Burr v.
Redhead, 52 Neb. 617; Matlock . Meyers, 64 Mo. 531; Elkins v. Kenyon, 34
Wis. 93; Sleeper v. Wood. 60 Fed. 88.
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ing the subject matter of a sale, the seller's honest opinion relative
thereto will not, as a rule, be held to be a warranty ;13 but if the seller
express an opinion on a matter of which he has special knowledge,
and on which the buyer did not, and could not be expected to have an
opinion, then the opinion so expressed is a warranty, if relied and
acted upon by the buyer.1"
A representation is an assertion of fact made by one party to
the other respecting the goods bargained for.15 Representations are
Com1monly made prior to the formation of the contract of sale, but
they may be made at that time or subsequently. However, whenever
made, they are no part of the contract of sale;16 and, even though
false, unless fraudulently made, afford no ground for a rescission of
the sale or recovery of damages.' 7 In the absence of fraud one has
no right to rely upon a representation, unless it was made in such a
manner and under such circumstances as warranted him in believing
that the party who made it intended to be bound by it. 8 Represen-
tati ns, however, may become foundations for actions for breaches of
warranty ;" that is, representations may become warranties, and such
is the case whenever by an understanding of the parties the represen-
talions are incorporated into and made a part of the contract of sale.
If such an understanding be not provable by direct evidence, it will
be implied where the seller asserted a material thing as a fact, of
which the buyer was ignorant, and on which the buyer relied. A
statement of fact incorporated into the contract of sale by implication
and thus made a warranty, is an express, not an implied, warranty as
it is often called.
Early in the civil law purchasers protected themselves from the
operation of the law of caveat emptor by exacting covenants as to
quality; particularly in the purchase of animals and slaves, whose
defects or diseases might not be discoverable until long after the sale.2 0
Such, too, was doubtless the practice of buyers in the early common
1 Linn v. Gunn, 56 Mich. 447, 23 N. W. 84; Roberts v. Applegate, 153 II. 210.
14 Benj. on Sales (5th ed), 659; Mechem on Sales, Secs. 1241-1243, and
illustrative cases in the notes.
I" Beni, on Sales, Sec. 561 (7th Am. ed.).
1 James & Co v Bocage & Co., 45 Ark. 284.
17 Hopkins v. Tanqueray, 15 C. B. 130. See facts of this case stated in
Benj on Sales, Sec. 610 (7th Am. ed.).
I 7immermin v. Nforro,. 28 Minn. 367.
li Crossman v Johnson, 63 Vt. 333, 22 Atl. 608, 13 L. R_ A. 678. The facts
f tlii, ,ae are wtry like those of Hopkins ,. Tanqneray, supra, and the
decic-in seems to be more sound and just than that of the English court.
20 Moyle's Contract of Sale in the Civil Law, 192.
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law; and it is easily conceivable that covenants as to other things, such
as title and fitness for use were soon added to those of quality. These
covenants were the first warranties in sales of goods, and were always
express in form and nature. A positive assertion by a seller that a
horse was sound was not a warranty unless the seller added that he
':warranted" him to be sound.21  In the course of time the technical
word warranty was held to be unessential; and it is now unquestioned
law that no particular words or form of words is necessary for the
creation of an express warranty.22
The recognition of informal promises as warranties was accom-
panied, or closely followed, by the conception that a statement of fact,
without semblance of a promise, might be an express warranty. pro-
vided, however, that the buyer relied upon it, and that the seller
intended the statement to be a warranty. It is still the universally
accepted rule that a warranty, to be actionable when broken, must have
been relied upon by the buyer;23 and in many jurisdictions the rule
that a seller must intend his words to be a warranty still persists.24
Whether a seller's statements were intended to be warranties or mere
representations or expressions of opinion, is an issue for the jury.25
However, the rule that is growing in favor and prevalence, and that
is supported by the greater weight of authority, is stated thus by the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin: "The better class of cases hold that a
positive affirmation of a material matter as a fact, intended to be
relied on, is a warranty, whether or not the seller mentally intended
to warrant or not. ' ' 25 But statements of fact relating to goods offered
for sale, where there is no fraud and the buyer can inspect the goods,
are not warranties, if the seller expressly refuses to warrant. 7
21 Chandelor v. Lopus, Cro. Jac. 4 (1625). See Williston on Sales, Sec. 195,
as to the nature of an action on a warranty.22 Polhemus v. Heiman, 45 Cal. 573: Hanson v. Busse, 45 Ill. 496; Unland v.Garton, 48 Neb. 202; Young v. Van Natta, 113 Mo. App. 550; Richardson v.Coffman, 87 Ia. 121; Shordan v. Kyler, 87 Ind. 38; Iler v. Jennings, 87 S. C. 87;Alvin Fruit Association v. Hartman, 146 Mo. App. 155, 123 S. W. 957.
23 Shoe Co. v. McDonald, 138 Mo. App. 328; Shuman v. Heater, 76 Neb.119; Richardson v. Mason, 53 Barb. 601; Woolsey v. Zieglar, 32 01:1. 715, 123
Pac. 167.
24 Polhemus v. Heiman, 45 Cal. 573; MeLennan v. Ohmen, 75 Cal. 558; Han-
son v. Busse, 45 I1. 496; Jones v. Quick, 28 Ind. 125; Mattock v. Meyers, 64
Mo. 531; Young v. Van Natta, 113 Mo. App. 550.
2 Unland v. Garton, 48 Neb. 202.
28 Hoffman v. Dixon, 105 Wis. 315. Also to the same effect, Danforth &Co. v. Crookshanks, 68 Mo. App. 311; Ingrahany v. Union Rv. Co., 19 R. 1. 356;
Miller v. Moore, 83 Ga. 684; Huntington v. Lombard, 22 Wash. 202.
2 Lynch v. Curfman, 65 Minn. 170, 68 N. W. 5; Fauntleroy v. Wilcox,
80 Ill. 477.
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Can there be a warranty in an executive contract of sale? The
decisions yield contradictory answers to this question. On the one
hand we are told that there may be warranties in executory as well
as in sales in presenti,28 and that the same rights and remedies attach
to warranties in executory as in executed sales.2 9  On the other hand
it has been decided that there can be no express warranty of quality
of that which does not exist;" and that a warranty is an incident only
of a consummated transaction and has no place as a contract in an
executory sale.' Happily, these cases are reconcilable, for a war-
ranty in an executory sale is really a condition precedent, 32 and it can-
not be sued on as a warranty. 3t Whether these collateral promises
in executory sales be called warranties or conditions precedent, it is
the general rule both in this country and in England that, if such a
promise be broken, the buyer may refuse the goods and sue for a
breach of the contract of sales.34 If, however, the buyer accept the
goods, or so deal with them as to vest in himself the title to them by
estoppel, the law as to the buyer's right to return the goods and sue on
his Nxarranty is by no means settled. In England and about one-half
of our states there cannot be in an executed sale a return of the goods
for a breach of warranty.35 The chief reason for this rule being that
tihe bu er cannot re-vest the title to the goods in the seller with-
out the latter's consent. The cogency of this reason is weakened or
destroyed by the universally recognized right of either party to a sale
to rescind the sale for fraud and re-vest the title to the goods. If one
may rescind and sue on a fraudulent warranty, why may he not do
so for a breach of a warranty untainted by fraud ?3" In either case the
2$ Polhemus x -Heiman, 45 Cal. 573; Maxwell v. Lee, 34 Minn. 511; White
N, Selloh, 74 WVis. 435.
2 Briiis % Hilton, 99 N. Y. 517.
3'' P~aomac Steamboat Co. v. Harlan Co., 66 Md. 42.
" ')hcrn v. Gantz, 60 N. Y, 540.
.2 Street %,. Blay, 2 B. & Ad. 456, 109 Eng. Reprint, 1212; Morse v. Stock
Yards Co., 21 Ore. 289, 14 L R A. 157.
3,, Harley v Golden State Iron Works, 66 Cal. 238; Halley v. Folsom, 1
N D 32;.
"',,The cases in which it has been held that, on the sale of a specific
chattel, the buyer's remedy is confined to a cross-action or to a defence by way
of r-duction of the price, are all cases of the bargain and sale of a special
chattel unconditionally, where consequently, the property had become vested
in the buyer; hut no similar case of an executory contract has been found."
Benjamin on Sales, Sec. 890 (7th Am. ed.).
. Ovens v. Sturges, 67 Ill. 366; Lynch v. Curfman, 65 Minn. 170, 68 N. W.
5, Thornton v. Wynn, 12 Wheat. 183; Street v. Blay, 2 B. & Ad. 456, 109
Eng. Reprint, 1212.
,ii Branson v. Turner, 77 Mo 489.
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result is the same-the buyer has not bought the goods bargained for
and desired. A large number of our states-among them Missouri "-
have adopted the juster rule that warranties will survive the accept-
ance of goods by the buyer,3 8 and that he may reject or return the
goods for a breach of warranty even though the property in the goods
has vested in him.39
Implied warranties are conclusions and inferences of law, from
facts, which are admitted or proved before the jury. 0 "A warranty
is implied where, from the circumstances surrounding the parties at
the time of the sale, or from the nature of the thing sold, the law
assumes it to be just that the buyer should be protected, in addition
to the contract of sale, by a further implied contract or guarantee on
the part of the vendor, and so raises by implication a warranty on
the seller's part." 41 With respect to the goods sold implied war-
ranties relate to title or quality. The law creates them in both executed
and executory sales, and makes them conclusive.
The development of the implied warranty of title from the time
it did not exist to its present perfection in the law of England is an
interesting study; but it must suffice now to say that a buyer does
not take goods caveat emptor as to title, as he did in the olden days. 42
Be a contract of sale oral or written, in the absence of an express
warranty of title, a seller by his act of selling, or by his agreement to
sell, impliedly warrants in sales in presenti that he has, and in sales
in futuro that he will have at the time of delivery, an indefeasible title,
free from all liens and incumbrances, and sufficient to secure to the
buyer the quiet possession of the goods purchased, as against any
lawful claims existing at the time of the sale.43 The exceptions to
3 Branson v. Turner, supra; Johnson v. Agricultural Co., 20 Mo. App. 100;
Viertel v. Smith, 55 Mo. App. 617.
38 Briggs v. Hilton, 99 N. Y. 517; Carleton v. Jenks, 80 Fed. 937.
39 See Williston on Sales, Sec. 608, notes 89 and 90, where numerous deci-
sions on both sides of the question are collected; Mechem on Sales, Sec. 1805,
Sales Act, Sec 69 (c); Wiley v. Athol, 150 Mass. 426, 23 N. E. 311, 6 L. R. A.
342; Day v. Pool, 52 N. Y. 416.
40 Borrekins v. Beavan, 3 Rawle, 23.41 Haines v. Neece, 116 Mo. App. 499, 92 S. W. 919; citing Biddle on War-
ranties in the Sale of Chattels, Sec. 3.42 Noy's Maxims, c. 42.
4 Sales Act, Sec. 13; Hodges v. Wilkinson, III N. C. 561, 17 L. R. A. 545;
Dresser v. Anisworth, 9 Barb. 619; Wood v. Sheldon, 42 N. J. L. 421; Marshall
v. Duke, 51 Ind. 62; Mathiney v. Mason, 73 Mo. 677; Burnside v. Burdette,
15 W. Va. 702.
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fht rule are Aes by pledgees,4" assignees in insolvency," trustees,4"
executois antd administrators' chattel mortgagees," receivers,49
sheriffs, constables or other judicial officers,"o persons known to buyers
to be agents,"' and by one joint tenant to another.5 2 It has been said
that in every sale of a chattel, if the possession be at the time in
another, and there be no warranty of title, the rule of caveat emptor
applies, and the party buys at his peril.53 This enunciation of the law
is sustained by numerous dicta and a few cases which are in point,
but it is seriously doubted to be settled law." There is no sound rea-
son for observing a distinction between sales made by sellers who
are in, and those who are out of possession; and it has been swept
away in England by the Sales of Goods Act,55 and in our country by
those states which have adopted the Sales Act.56 In the other states
the trend of the decisions is in favor of the English rule,57 and one
may safely predict that in the very near future it will be uniformly
held that a sale of an article carries with it a warranty of title even
though the seller be not in possession, except where the buyer knows
that the article is in the adverse possession of a third party.
Caveat Venditor expresses the civil law rule that if the seller
wishes to secure himself from future responsibility in case the goods
should afterwards be found to be different in kind or quality from
what the parties supposed them to be, he must provide against such a
responsibility by a particular agreement with the purchaser.58 The
converse of this rule is our thoroughly established maxim of caveat
emptor, an ancient rule of the common law, that as to quality of the
44 Morley %. Attenborough, 3 Ex. 500.
45 Johnson v. Laybourn, 56 Minn. 332.
46 Rick,, Adm'r v. Dillahunty, 8 Port. 133; John Storm v. Smith, 43 Miss.
497,
4 Bingham v. Maxey, 15 111. 295.
41 Sheppar, v Earles, 13 Hun. 651.
' Barron v. Mullin, 21 Minn. 374.
STillcv v. Bridges, 105 Ill. 336: Neal v. Gillaspy, 56 Ind. 451 ; Hensley v.
Baker, 10 Mo. 157; The Monte Allegre, 9 Wheat. 616; Sales Act, Sec. 13 (4).
51 Irwin v. Thompson, 27 Kan. 643.
52 Giirley v. Dickson, 19 Tex. Civ. App. 203, 46 S. W. 53.
5'2 Kent, 478
4 See Bennett's notes, Benj on Sales (7th Am. Ed.), 674, where the
casus cited as authorities for the doctrine are collected and analyzed. Williston
on Sales, Sec, 218
5 1 Sec 12
-' Sec, 13 The Sales Act has been adopted by Ariz., Conn., Ill., Md.,
Mass, Mich, Nev., N. Y., N. J., Ohio, Pa., R. I., Wis., Vol. II, No. 3, The
American Bar Association Journal, 710.
5,1ond v. Bourgeois, 51 N. 1. L. 361, 18 Atl. 64.
38 Wright v. Hart, 18 Wend. 449; Morey's Outlines of Roman Law, 363.
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goods the buyer takes them at his own risk. 9 The early rigorous
application of the maxim has been gradually relaxed, and many excep-
tions to it admitted. Indeed, the exceptions to the rule are more im-
portant law than the rule itself, and our maxim is yielding to the
influence and justice of the rule of the civil law. It is now well under-
stood law that caveat emplor does not apply where there is an express
warranty;f or where there is fraud on the part of the seller;" or
where there are defects in the goods which are not discoverable by
reasonable inspection by the buyer; 62 or in sales by manufacturers
and growers of their own products.63 In executory sales for future
delivery there is an implied warranty that the goods will be merchant-
able 64 when delivered,65 but not of any particular degree of fineness
or quality within merchantability. 6 So, in sales by description where
the buyer has not inspected the goods, there is an implied warranty
that the goods shall be salable.6 7  Especially is this true where the
description comprehends quality as well as kind, as in the sale of
"No. 2, White mixed corn."6 s  That a seller deliver goods which
conform to the description, has been decided to be an implied war-
ranty ;"1 but it is really a condition precedent. Notwithstanding some
decisions to the contrary 70 payment of a sound price does not raise
an implied warranty of quality.7 1 And in a sale of secondhand goods
59 Broom's Legal Maxims, 768.60 Hargous v. Stone, 5 N. Y. 73.
61 McAdams v. Cates, 24 Mo. 223; Croyle v. Moses, 90 Pa. 250, 35 Am.
Rep. 654.62 Grigsbey v. Stapleton, 94 Mo. 423; Rothmiller v. Stein, 143 N. Y. 581;
26 L. R. A. 148.6 3 Bierman v. City Mills Co., 151 N. Y. 482, 37 L. R. A. 799; Barnard V.
Kellogg, 10 Wall., 383.
64 Merchantable quality means ordinary quality; marketable quality; bring-
ing the average price, at least, of medium quality of goodness; good merchan-
dise of stable quality; free from any remarkable defect. 5 Words and Phrases,
4490, citing Warner v. Arctic Ice Co., 74 Me. 475.
65Howard v. Hoey, 23 Wend. 350; Fogel v. Brubaker, 122 Pa. St. 7; Mer-
riam v. Field, 24 Wis. 640.
6 Fitch v. Archiband, 29 N. J. L. 160.
67 Beni. on Sales (7th Am. Ed.), Sec. 656.68 Miller & Co. v. Moore, 83 Ga. 684, 6 L. R. A. 374; Whittaker v. McCor-
mick, 6 Mo. App. 114; Gachet v. Warren, 72 Ala. 288; Ober v. Blalock, 40 S. C.
31; Hasting v. Lovering, 2 Pick. 214; Forcheimer v. Stewart, 65 Ia. 593.69 Hoffman v. Dixon, 105 Wis. 315, 76 Am. St. Rep. 916; White v. Miller,
71 N. Y. 118; Borrekins v. Bevan, 3 Rawle, 23.
70Lester v. Graham, 1 Mill (1 Constitutional) (S. C.), 182; Barnard v.
Yates, I Nott & McC. 142.
71 Sound price does not raise a warranty of quality-W right v. Hart, 18
Wend. 449; Mixer v. Coburn, 11 Met. 559; Warren Glass Works Co. v. Coal
Co., 65 Md. 547.
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there is no implied warranty of quality or fitness for use;72 but in a
sale by a dealer there is an implied warranty that an article is new-
not secondhand 3
Akin to the implied warranty of merchantability is that of fitness
for use. If a chattel be made to order and no special use thereof be
mentioned to the manufacturer, he impliedly warrants that it will be
reasonably fit for the purpose for which it is ordinarily used.74  But
there is no implied warranty that a chattel will be reasonably fit for a
particular purpose, unless that purpose was communicated to the
manufacturer or dealer and the buyer relied on his judgment in sup-
plying the article. 75 Where the seller is not the manufacturer, and
the purchaser knows that fact, in the absence of an express warranty
or proof of fraud and deceit on the part of the seller, he is not respon-
sible for latent defects, even though he knew of the intended use.76
P.ut where the seller is the manufacturer or grower of the goods, which
he supplies for a particular use, he impliedly warrants, according to
all the decisions, against all latent defects due to processes of manu-
facture or growing, whether known to him or not; 77 and by what
seems to be the preponderance of authority he is also liable for defec-
tive materials whether he knew of the defect or used due care in
selecting them.71 No implied warranty of fitness for a particular use,
even though made known to the seller, arises where the buyer relies on
his own judgment and receives the very thing which he selected or
nrdered by description. 79
Can there be both express and implied warranties in a contract
of sale " The answer to this question very obviously ought to be in
72 Rammin v Caldwell, 43 I1. App. 175; Norris v. Reinstedler, 90 Mo.
App 626 Bnt in Hall Furniture Co. v. Crane Breed Mfg. Co., 85 S. E. 35,
L. R A 1915, E 428, the Supreme Court of North Carolina held that the seller
of a second-hand hearse was bound to furnish an article capable of being
used.
, Grieb v. Cole, 60 Mich. 397.
,4 Benjamin on Sales (7th Am. Ed.), Sec. 645.
75 Armstrong v. Tobacco Co., 41 Mo. App. 254; Morse v. Stock Yards Co.,
21 Ore 289, 14 L. R. A. 157; Omaha Coal Co. v. Fay, 37 Neb. 68; Dushane v.
Ben dict, 120 U. S. 630,
78 Amcrican Forcite Co. v. Brady, 4 App. Div. 95; Gentilli v. Starace, 133
N. Y. 140.
77 White v. Miller, 71 N. Y. 118; Carleton v. Lombard, 149 N. Y. 137 and
601; Am. Forcite Co. v. Brady, supra.
8 Randall v. Newson, 2 Q. B. D. 102; Rodgers v. Niles, 11 0. St. 48;
Brown v. Sayles, 27 Vt. 227. Contra: Hoe v. Sanborn, 21 N. Y. 552.
"I Davis Calyx Drill Co. v. Mallory, 137 Fed. 332, 69 L. R. A. 973; Hight
, Bacon, 126 Mass. 10; Kohl v. Lindley, 39 II1. 195; Tilton Safe Co. v. Tisdale,
48 Vt 83; Talbot Paving Co. v. Gorman, 103 Mich. 403, 27 L. R. A. 96; Chan-
ter v. Hopkins, 4 M. & W. 399.
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the affirmative; for there is no reason why both the law and the seller
may not make warranties for the buyer's protection; but it has been
answered in the negative by a number of able courts. "Nor is there
any question as to an implied warranty, of title or otherwise. There
being an express warranty, that must be taken to contain the entire
contract on the part of the seller."80 This old rule of law has been
rejected by many courts and modified by others, and is no longer sus-
lained by the weight of authority. The Missouri Court of Appeals in
deciding that express and implied warranties may exist together said:
"An express warranty, to exclude an implied warranty, must be of
such a character as to make it apparent that the expressed warranty
contained all the obligations assumed by the warrantor." 81 Two war-
ranties may be so distinct and separate that both may stand, as in the
case of an express warranty of title and an implied warranty of mer-
chantability.8 2 But there is still a strong current of authority that an
express warranty of one quality excludes implied warranties as to
other qualities, or fitness for use.83 The trend of the decisions, how-
ever, is toward a simple and just rule, which will in the not distant
future be generally recognized, namely; any two or more warranties
may co-exist in the same contract of sale if they are distinct and not
inconsistent.8 4.
A warranty in a sale of goods is neither negotiable nor assignable,
and it does not run with the goods. It is a personal indemnity, and
the liability of the indemnitor cannot be extended to third parties; and
therefore a sub-buyer cannot recover on a warranty given by, or im-
posed by law on the original seller, for there is no privity of contract
between them.85.
W. W. KrYsoR.
80 Osborn v. Nicholson, 13 Wall. 654; Garr, Scott & Co. v. Hodges, 90 S. W.
580 (Ky).81 Boulware v. Mfg. Co., 152 Mo. App. 567.
82Merriam v. Field, 24 Wis. 640.
8 Carleton v. Lombard Ayres & Co., 25 N. Y. Supp. 570; Cosgrove v.
Bennett, 32 Minn. 371; Wasatch Orchard Co. v. Canning Co., 32 Utah 229,
12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 540; Dwight Bros. Paper Co. v. Western Paper Co., 114
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